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THE NECESSITY OF A JOINT SECURITY PACT BETWEEN TÜRKİYE, AZERBAIJAN, AND PAKISTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY

Annotation

Lately, alliances, pacts, and collaboration organizations have begun to be established in international politics. Nearly all these structures are security based since the international system has been clogged for "the last decade. Due to the intensication of conflicts, especially with the period of Arab Spring, number of regions whose orders have been disrupted because of chaos and confusion, have increased. Consequently, the expectation of a comprehensive and extensive reestablishment in the international system has emerged. This prospect of transformation led to the formation of additional security-based structures. Anteriorly, Türkiye was the main actor of the Saadabad Pact which is a security-based structure. In recent years, although Türkiye has taken part in international alliances, it has been left alone over against the problems that occured especially in the Middle East and the North of the Black Sea. This situation has prompted Türkiye to take part in regional alliances. For instance, in 2021, Pakistan and Türkiye were able to jointly conduct a military exercise in Azerbaijan. In this context, struggling to create a secure zone for itself, Türkiye will be able to provide its security by setting up similar structures in line with the regional security complex theory at the present time.

The aim of the study is to reveal Türkiye's need for new safety nets in line with the changing conditions in the context of national security in connection with the developing regional and international conjuncture. In the study, it will be evaluated whether it is possible to form a security pact by gathering Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan on a common security platform.

Keywords: Saadabad Pact, Copenhagen School, Regional Security Complex, Türkiye, Pakistan, Azerbaijan.

Korkmaz Kurshat

REGIONAL TƏHLÜKƏSIZLIK KOMPLEKS NƏZƏRIYYƏSI MƏNZƏTİNDƏ TÜRKİYƏ, AZƏRBAYCAN VƏ PAKİSTAN ARASINDA BİRGƏ TƏHLÜKƏSIZLİK PAKTINA EHTİYAC

Annotasiya

Son zamanlar beynəlxalq siyasətdə ittifaqlar, paktlar, əməkdaşlıq təşkilatları yaranmağa başlamışdır. Beynəlxalq sistem son onillikdə "tıxandığından" bu strukturların demək olar ki, hamısı təhlükəsizliyə əsaslanır. Xüsusilə Ərəb Baharı zamanı münaqişələrin şiddətlənməsi ilə xaos və çaşqınlıq səbəbindən nizam-intizamı pozulan bölgələrin sayı artmışdır. Nəticədə beynəlxalq sistemdə hərtərəfli və geniş şəkildə yenidənqurulma gözləntiləri yarandı. Bu keçid perspektivi əlavə təhlükəsizlik əsaslı strukturların formalaşmasına səbəb oldu. Əvvəllər Türkiyə təhlükəsizlik təməlli bir quruluş olan Saadabad paktının əsas aktoru idi. Türkiyə son illərdə beynəlxalq ittifaqlarda iştirak etsə də xüsusilə Yaxın Şərqdə və Qara dənizin şimalında baş verən problemlər qarşısında təkbaşına qalmışdır. Bu vəziyyət Türkiyəni regional ittifaqlarda iştirak etməyə sövq etmişdir. Məsələn, 2021-ci ildə Pakistan və Türkiyə Azərbaycanda birgə hərbi təlim keçirə bildilər. Bu kontekstdə özünə təhlükəsiz zona yaratmaq üçün mübarizə aparan Türkiyə hazırda regional təhlükəsizlik kompleksi nəzəriyyəsinə uyğun oxşar strukturlar quraraq öz təhlükəsizliyini təmin edə biləcəkdir.

Tədqiqatın məqsədi inkişaf edən regional və beynəlxalq konyuktura ilə əlaqədar olaraq milli təhlükəsizlik kontekstində dəyişən şərtlərə uyğun olaraq Türkiyənin yeni təhlükəsizlik şəbəkələrinə ehtiyacını ortaya çıxarmaqdır. Araşdırmada Türkiyə, Azərbaycan və Pakistanı ortaq

təhlükəsizlik platformasında toplayaraq təhlükəsizlik paktı yaratmağın mümkün olub-olmadığı qiymətləndiriləcəkdir.

Açar sözlər: *Saadabad paktı, Kopenhagen məktəbi, Regional Təhlükəsizlik Kompleksi, Türkiyə, Pakistan, Azərbaycan.*

Introduction

"Recently, it is seen that alliances, pacts and cooperation organizations have begun to be established in international politics. It is also noteworthy that these structures are mostly security-based. After these developments, questions such as what these security-based structures are aiming and why they have gained intensity in the last period came to the fore.

In the last ten years, international system is clogged, conflicts intensified, and after the period that started with the Arab Spring, the geographies that have been disrupted by chaos and turmoil have begun to increase. In the light of these data, the expectation of a comprehensive and great change in the international system emerges. In political history, there are examples of great wars as a result of such chaos and increased stalemate processes. In this context, discourses such as that the current international system reminds the period and developments before the First World War or the Second World War attract attention. The practical versions of these discourses are the structures established by security-based states. Security-based pacts and alliances were established in this way before the First and Second World Wars.

AUKUS, which was established by the USA, England and Austria together, and QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), established by India, Australia, Japan and the USA, are examples of these security structures. There are comments that the "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)" structure, under the leadership of China, in which 15 states came together in the Pacific at the end of last year, was created in response to ASEAN, which includes the USA. In addition, movements have started to activate the Three Seas Initiative, which was signed in 2015 to stop Russia's expansionist aims, in which 12 eastern members of the European Union participated. Three seas indicate the Adriatic, Black Sea and Baltic seas.

Finally, on 24th of February 2022, as a result of Russia's attacks on Ukraine that turned into a war, some European countries reacted to the Russian threat. In the face of the Russian threat, Finland and Sweden, which had neutral status for years, applied for candidacy to become a member of NATO due to security concerns.

While these developments occur in international politics, security-based developments also take place in Türkiye's near basin. With the security agreements it made with the USA, Greece enabled USA to establish military bases in some parts of Greece. In addition, two NATO members, Greece and France, signed a security-based defense agreement. While these developments were taking place around Türkiye, security flaws in Türkiye's southern borders with Syria and Iraq have reached dangerous levels. In addition, because of the war between Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea in the North, it has become another destabilized region. Being a member of NATO which is a security organization, Türkiye has been left alone in the fight against terrorism by its allies recently. As a matter of fact, most of the time, NATO allies took a position against Türkiye. In this direction, Türkiye needs to establish safety nets in its near basin against regional military conflicts and natural disasters. For Türkiye, the most suitable countries for such security cooperation in the current conditions are Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Especially in recent years, the Azerbaijani army has succeeded in the 44-day war in the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, as a result of the joint action of these three states in almost every field and their common principles and theoretical discourses.

Between September 11th to 20th, 2021, a joint exercise called "Three Brothers 2021" was conducted in Azerbaijan with the participation of Türkiye and Pakistan. Thereby, the special forces of these three countries conducted joint exercises for the first time. It was emphasized that the main purpose of the exercise was to improve the interaction of the special forces of friendly and partner countries during combat operations, to prepare for operations in peace and wartime, and to

exchange information and experience. In the security context, this first joint exercise is an important step towards building a comprehensive security pact.

The aim of this study is to reveal Türkiye's need for new safety nets suitable for changing conditions in the context of national security in connection with the developing regional and international conjuncture. In this direction, considering the historical and geographical factors, it is seen that Türkiye has the potential to create a safety net in the surrounding area. In the historical process, Türkiye has established pacts in association with Asia, the most important of which is the Saadabat Pact led by Türkiye. In this study, it will be evaluated the possibility of Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan to come together on a common security platform and form a security pact. On the other hand, this subject will be discussed theoretically within the scope of the Regional Security Complex Theory.

This study, which deals with the need for a joint security pact between Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan in the Context Of Regional Security Complex Theory, consists of three main topics. In the first main topic, information about the Sadabat Pact, which is a regional security alliance including Türkiye, is given. In the second main topic, the regional security complex theory, which has come to the fore in security studies recently, is discussed. In the third main topic, a pact that can be established between Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan has been evaluated in the context of Regional Security Complex Theory.

The Saadabad Pact As A Regional Security Alliance

The Saadabad Pact is described as the first modern security-based regional security alliance in the Middle East geography. The pact was formed because the member states evaluated the elements that threatened the region before the Second World War as external threats. The main reason that brought Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq together in the Saadabad Pact was the preservation of non-aggression and friendship because the countries that signed the pact were countries that had gone through colonial or semi-colonial processes and the ones that gained their independence later on. (Akdevelioğlu, Kürkçüoğlu: 2002: p. 365-366).

This alliance was basically established as a regional security alliance against Mussolini's Italy, which did not hesitate to express its vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region during the interwar period. This view, which argues that the external threat perception is the primary reason for the alliance, is basically based on two events. The first is that, in Mussolini's speech at the Fascist Congress on March 19, 1934, he clearly stated that Italy's historical interests lie in Asia and Africa. This expansionist and revisionist speech was met with concern, especially in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean countries, and the search for an alliance to consolidate regional security became an issue. The second important development is the start of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia from October 3, 1935. The fact that the draft agreement on the establishment of a regional pact in Geneva between Türkiye, Iran and Iraq was paraphed only one day before this date, is perceived as an indicator of the Italian threat (Zurcher, 2004: p.202; Gönlübol, Sar, 1963: p.104; Hale, 2000: p.55).

In the studies on the establishment of the Saadabad Pact, it has been stated that Italy was not the only foreign threat perception of the founding countries, but also the Middle East turned into a serious competition center between the Soviet Union and England since the mid-1930s and this situation created new external threat perceptions for Iran and Afghanistan, which have historically problematic past with these two countries. On the other hand, these states did not want to be indifferent to the expansionist policy of Soviet Russia since 1922 (Watt, 1998: p. 342).

Two authors, İsmail Soysal and D. C. Watt, who took the Saadabad Pact as an academic thesis, state that this pact was not established as a result of an external threat. In short, Soysal and Watt sought the reasons for the establishment of the Saadabad Pact in the solution of bilateral border problems and cooperation efforts in the field of regional security rather than the perception of external threat. (Soysal, 1999: p. 338; Watt, 1988: p. 333-334). In this respect, the Saadabad Pact, also known as the "Türkiye, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran Non-Aggression Treaty", is a political

cooperation based on negotiations between the states parties in order to maintain peace in the region by avoiding attacks and provocations. (Bayraktar, 2012: p: 85).

According to the articles of the Saadabad Pact, which consists of 10 articles, the parties will not interfere in each other's internal affairs, the inviolability of borders will be ensured, the principle of non-aggression will be implemented, they will consult each other on international issues, good neighborly relations will be developed, the Law of the League of Nations and world peace will be respected. When the articles of the pact are examined, it is understood that it is a treaty based on mutualisation (Cengiz, 2003: p: 41). This project was implemented with the Saadabad Pact in Tehran on July 8, 1937.

After the Saadabad Pact was signed, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk used the following statements regarding the Pact:

"*The friendship and closeness policy that the Republic Government was following in the East took a new strong step. The quadrilateral agreement we signed with our friends Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran in Saadabad, is one of the remarkable works of peace with great pleasure. We are confident that the cooperation between the governments of the states gathered around this treaty, who sincerely want to pursue the same goal and be in peace, will yield beneficial results in the future*". (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 2006: p: 859).

The four countries to form the Saadabad Pact, one after another, became members of the League of Nations, the most comprehensive organization of the period, in order to be recognized by the international community. In order to mutually recognize each other's territorial integrity, borders and the legitimacy of their regimes, they both chose to make a series of bilateral agreements, and also they created the Saadabad Pact, thinking that a regional security pact would strengthen this recognition. In other words, the Saadabad Pact was perceived as an important tool, fundamentally for both internal security (Regime security) and external security (Regional security) by the founding states (Palabıyık, 2010: p: 158).

Another important reason why Türkiye, Iraq and Iran sought a regional alliance during the establishment of the Saadabad Pact was the splinter Kurdish rebellion, which was perceived as a threat by all three states. In fact, this issue is an internal threat since it manifests as internal rebellion or unrest within the states. This situation was disliked by the newly established nation-states, which were extremely sensitive about their borders. When Türkiye, Iran and Iraq sought a way to define their borders clearly and develop a national identity within the framework of state and nation building, they faced eventful Kurdish revolts. This situation has brought the three states closer to each other in order to resolve this common issue (Palabıyık, 2010: p.159). In the 1920s, the head of the Kurdish-origin Shekak tribe living in the Urmia region of Iran, Ismail Aga (better known as Simko), rebelled against the rule of Reza Shah, and these rebellions were suppressed barely in the late 1920s. In 1925, Türkiye struggled with the Sheikh Said rebellion, after which Kurdish rebellions continued throughout the 1930s. Especially the Kurdish tribes engaged in banditry activities on the Türkiye-Iran border caused serious problems between the two countries. In 1930, Türkiye occupied Little Ararat in order to suppress the movement of Kurdish rebels around the Little Ararat Mountain, which is actually within the borders of Iran and Iran accepted this fait accompli only with the border agreement made with Türkiye in 1932. In the north of Iraq, since the early 1930s, the rebellions of the Barzan tribe has put this new breakaway state in a difficult position (Akdevelioğlu ve Kürk- çüoğlu, 2002: p. 366).

The need for a joint solution to this problem increased since the separatist Kurdish rebellions concentrated especially around the borders of the three countries and that the rebels moved within these three countries occasionally. As Andrew Mango expressed:

"*Despite occasional temporary disagreements due to their different political leanings, the presence of the Kurdish threat brought Turkish Ankara and Arab Baghdad together. Although the Kurdish threat was perceived in varying extent, the Kurds helped the establishment of cooperation between Türkiye and Iran*" (Mango, 1968: p. 230).

The reasons for Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to join the Saadabad Pact were generally similar. In all three states, the elites that had just come to power, followed a foreign policy based on establishing good relations with their neighbors in order to establish and strengthen their regimes, and as a result, they saw the Saadabad Pact as a good opportunity.

In fact, it is possible to explain Türkiye's initiation and participation in the establishment of this pact, not with the weakness or lack of legitimacy of the regime in Türkiye, but on the contrary, with the strength and legitimacy of the regime. This strong regime has generated self-confidence and this self-confidence has contributed to the perception of Türkiye as a regional leader. The fact that Türkiye was founded as a result of a national struggle, and, although it had a Muslim population, it orientated to the West and adopted the development model of the West, and its relatively more successful implementation compared to other Middle Eastern states increased Türkiye's international recognition and prestige. In the 1930s, Türkiye reminds of a construction site; railways, factories, buildings with a new and modern architectural design and also, works of art stand out all over the country. This situation paved the way for Middle Eastern states to perceive Türkiye as a model (Palabıyık, 2010: p.160).

The evaluation of the Saadabad Pact by the international community also highlights Türkiye's regional leadership potential. Commenting on the visit of Türkiye's Foreign Affairs Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras to Baghdad to carry out negotiations on the Saadabad Pact, *Great Britain and East* magazine mentions Turkey as:

"*The visit of the Turkish delegation to Baghdad is an example of how Türkiye leads the nations of the East. The fundamental advices given by the Turks to the neighboring nations are of great value*" (Palabıyık, 2010: p.171).

As a consequence, it can be said that Türkiye cooperates with its eastern neighbors not only to find a common solution to the border issues or separatist Kurdish rebellions, but also because it wants the modernization process to be implemented effectively in these countries as well. If these states can continue their development and stabilize their regimes by getting rid of the inertia of underdevelopment thanks to modernization, Türkiye will also create a safety net in its near basin and will greatly benefit from it.

Regional Security Complex Theory

The subjects committed in the Saadabad Pact are power, security, war, peace and conflict resolution, which are among the theoretical subjects of the discipline of international relations. Security is one of these concepts and it was introduced by the Copenhagen School at the end of the 1980s at a comprehensive and inclusive level of analysis. When the approach of the Copenhagen School is examined in terms of the discipline of international relations, it is seen that the subject is analyzed with an analytical and comprehensive perspective on security.

The approach of the Copenhagen School is qualified as a critical approach to the understanding of security that was put forward by the realist school because the Copenhagen School stated that the realist school approaches security from a narrow perspective and considers security only as a high politics issue such as military and political security. (Buzan, 1991: p. 8) Also, the Copenhagen School criticizes the realist school as being state centric. However, the Copenhagen School stated that they did not aim to create an alternative theory, but wanted to present different perspectives by improving the existing approach. Wæver, one of the representatives of the school, expressed this situation as *our aim is not answering the question of what is security but to answer what else is security.* (Wæver, 1997: p. 47).

Being one of the critical study schools, The Copenhagen School stands out with its "Securitization", "Security sectors" and "Regional security complex" approaches in security studies. Securitization is about the assertion of an issue as a security issue through the speech act, the attempt to take action in this direction and the consensus building by a certain group that the issue is a security issue, and building consensus by a particular group that the issue is a security issue. Security sectors are not only a military issue, but also a subject that has political, economic, social and environmental aspects and is classified separately from these aspects (Baysal&Lüleci,

2015: p. 70-71). The regional security complex, on the other hand, is expressed as a complex that can be formed by actors with geographical proximity and common values. In this context, in order for a region to be defined as a regional security complex, the states of the region must first show a common will to securitize any issue. The Copenhagen School works by separating the world into different regional security complexes (Buzan&Wæver, 2003; Buzan, Wæver&Wilde, 1998).

The regional security complex theory, like the other approaches of the Copenhagen School, was produced for Europe and tries to explain this region. However, after the Cold War, this theory was redefined by the Copenhagen School, and in this approach, regional security was emphasized against global security. With the theory of the regional security complex, the concept of securitization has been made practical in the field of global politics. In addition, as a result of this theory's acceptance of sectoral security as well as geographical security, a new perspective has emerged against other security approaches (Kaya, 2019: p. 55).

Buzan defined regional security basically as a concept formed within the framework of balance of power, historical friendship and hostilities. On the other hand, the regional security complex approach was developed primarily for the fields of military and political security, like the Copenhagen School's approach to securitization and sectoral analysis. Since the 1990s, this theory has been made a common approach by the representatives of the School and other security sectors have been included in the regional security analysis. Thus, regional security, which is defined as a subsystem, has been brought to the fore. (Buzan, Waever, Wilde, 1998: p. 53). According to the theory in question, regional security complexes have a dynamic structure rather than a static one. Therefore, these regions may change over time and new complexes may form. In addition, the security sectors that are active within the regional security complexes may differ. For example, when the regional security complexes of the Middle East and South Asia are examined, it is seen that the military and political sectors are at the forefront, whereas when the European and North American security regions are examined, it is seen that the political, economic and social security sectors become prominent. Based on this information, it can be concluded that the regional security complex is a mutually formed security dependency due to the geographical proximity, historical ties and relations between the states or state groups in a region. Regional security dependency is shaped within the framework of power balances, security contradictions and security structures in terms of international relations. (Buzan&Wæver, 2003: p.463).

Emphasizing geography and security threats, Buzan defined the regional security complex as *two or more states* whose *national security is too complex to be considered separately within a certain framework (Geographically and militarily) to be interdependent to a certain extent for the main security concerns.* (Buzan, 1991: p. 40).

In the regional security complex approach of the Copenhagen School, the region is expressed as a geography shaped around the security environment where it is easy to transfer power militarily and politically. (Buzan, Waever, Wilde, 1998: p. 12). In this context, for a region to be defined as a regional security complex, it must have the characteristics that distinguish it from other regions; the region must be geographically close to each other and be suitable for the transportation of military elements (Buzan&Wæver, 2013: p. 47).

Buzan lists the factors that affect the formation of a regional security complex and/or the establishment of a security system by the countries of the region as follows:

1. Geographical proximity of countries to each other.
2. The interconnectedness of the security of the states of the region.
3. Convergence of geostrategic interests of the states of the region and the existence of mutual power relations or rivalry.
4. The existence of significant interactions between the countries of the region, including neighborliness, defense, assistance, suspicion, or fear. (Buzan &Wæver, 2003: p. 51).

According to the regional security complex theory, common security threats of states bring them together and this unity enables them to establish a complex and to cooperate. Especially among the neighboring countries, the basis of the security problem is the perception of near threat

rather than distant threat. Although distant geographies are considered as areas of economic threat, the regional security complex theory is based on the idea that the element that will threaten security comes from a close geographical distance. Thus, states tend to securitize other states that share the territory and this trend encompasses not only military and political security but also environmental issues (Kaya, 2019: p. 56). In this direction, there are some variables that enable the establishment of the regional security complex. These variables are border (Separating a regional security complex from a neighboring complex), anarchic structure (Territorial security complex should consist of two or more autonomous units), polarity (Includes power distribution between units), and social structure (Includes inter-unit friend and enemy extents) (Buzan&Wæver, 2003).

According to the regional security complex theory, dangers spread more easily from the near geography rather than from the far. Therefore, mutual security dependency becomes much more intense within regional security complexes. According to Buzan and Waevar, in historical processes, states have mostly experienced security quandaries in their borders with their neighbouring countries. The securitization and mutual security dependency has been more intense among the actors inside these complexes than with the outside actors (Buzan&Waever, 2003: p. 4). As a result, security emerges as an area where the factors arising from sharing a common geography are highly effective (Buzan & Waever, 2003: p. 30).

The regional security complex theory evaluates regions only on the basis of security and determines the boundaries of regional security complexes according to their security relations. Therefore, the boundaries of regional security complexes may not always coincide with the natural, real, cultural, geographical or historical boundaries of the relevant region (Birdişli, 2017: p.126-127). For a region to be considered a regional security complex, there must be such a degree of mutual security interdependency that a group of states differentiates themselves from the surrounding security zones and integrates them into an interrelated whole. Buzan & Waever, 2003: p. 47). Even though mutual security dependency arises from issues such as the security relations of the states within the regional complex, the distribution of power in the region, historical relations, border disputes, ethnic relations, and common culture, in the formation of a regional security complex, factors such as competition, balance of power and cooperation among regional actors come to the fore. (Buzan, 2007: p. 159).

Thus, regional security complexes are divided into four groups as "Standard", "Centred", "Great power complexes" and "Super complexes" in terms of the distribution of power within them and the characteristics of the actors that compose it. In standard regional security complexes, the security extent is evaluated in relation to the interaction between regional powers, and these structures are multipolar, with regional powers at their poles. In centered complexes, only one power is dominant and there is a unipolar system. In great power complexes, bipolar or multipolar regional security complexes are seen, in which more than one global power can also participate. On the other hand, in super complexes, a great power simultaneously affects neighboring regions and causes strong security dynamics between regions to be formed. (Buzan&Waever, 2003: p. 55-69).

Although the boundaries of the regional security complex are not static, they can change depending on various factors. Factors that can cause change can be listed as intra-regional alliance relations, the influence of a superpower or great power in the region. (Buzan&Weaver, 2003: p. 53-54). In this context, there has been a change in security-related parameters in the post-Cold War period, and one of the most important debates of the post-Cold War period was that whether this new period would evolve to a unipolar or multipolar global system. (Korkmaz, 2021: p. 210-211). Buzan and Waever suggested that the alliances formed by the gathering of more than one state, as well as states, can be characterized as a pole at the global level, and they emphasized that EU-style structures are an important example of regional alliances in the international system. Buzan and Waever suggested that in addition to states, alliances formed by multiple states can also be described as a pole at the global level and they emphasized that EU-style structures are an important example of regional alliances within the international system. In this approach, states

that can be effective in international politics are examined in three categories. In the first category, superpowers with military, economic and political capacity that can be effective at the global level are presented. In the second category, the great powers that are taken into account in the calculations of global power distribution and that can be effective in more than one region are discussed. Finally, in the third category, there are regional powers that can be effective at the regional level are presented. In this context, the Cold War period was evaluated as a period in which two superpowers, the USA and the USSR and three great powers; China, Germany and Japan were effective (2+3). On the other hand, the post-Cold War period was evaluated as a period in which the superpower USA and four major powers; England/Germany/France-EU, China, Japan and Russia and regions were effective. (1+4+ regions) (Buzan&Waever, 2003: p. 34-37). In addition, new protection areas of security in the post-Cold War period were classified into five sub-categories and a new adaptation was developed with the securitization theory. The five sub-categories are listed as follows:

1. Military Security (Force-based pressure relations).

2. Political Security (Power, management relations).

3. Economic Security (Trade, production, financial relations)

4. Societal Security (Identity related relations).

5. Environmental Security (Human activities and environmental issues on the planet) (Buzan & Waever, 2003).

Evaluation of Türkiye Azerbaijan Pakistan Security Pact in the Context of Regional Security Complex Theory

According to Buzan and Waever, there are two developments that made regional security relations came into prominence in the post-Cold War period. The first one is that, with the disappearance of superpower competition in the post-Cold War era, global powers' quest for influence in other parts of the world has diminished. Secondly, internal public opinions of the global powers did not want their states to interfere with the problematical areas in other parts of the world by interacting with them. These two developments have enabled regional states to produce politics in their own geographies and in an environment far away from great powers. (Buzan&Waever, 2003: p.10- 11).

When Buzan and Wæver's views on Türkiye are examined, it can be seen that they delineate Türkiye as the country that separates three important regional security complexes (Post-Soviet, Europe and the Middle East) and as the neighbouring country to four major sub-security complexes with high conflict potential (Balkans, Caucasus, Levant and Gulf). They also claimed that Türkiye had the intention to become a regional power but could not achieve this because they argued that Türkiye could not bring countries together that belong to different complexes such as Greece, Syria and Russia. (Buzan&Waever, 2003: p. 392). In addition, Türkiye is trying to destroy the perception of being an insulator country and its use of soft power elements in the region is an example of this. While it is evaluated that a much stronger Türkiye as a regional great power can trigger the integration of its neighbors and it can become a pole in terms of the regional security complex, they predicted that if Türkiye could not produce a more active policy in the future, it would maintain its traditional insulator country position. However, Buzan and Wæver's views that were written in 2003, contradict the active foreign policy understanding at the regional and global level that Türkiye has recently put forward.

Although securitization maintain its importance at the international level, Pakistani society is facing threats of divisiveness due to the fact that it is increasingly at security risk based on ethnic and religious identity. Since the military and intelligence services both are semi-autonomous in the domestic political structure, there is internal splits and uncertainty about common interests. This internal inconsistency is temporary or newly-emerging situation. However, even though Pakistan has a fragmented structure in terms of domestic politics throughout its political history since independence, there has not been any major change in direction such as dissolution. Pakistan has been steadily allocating political resources since 1947. Therefore, the state can withstand long-

term threats of dissolution or a permanent inconsistency within its current boundaries (Buzan&Waever, 2003: p.111).

The struggle between Pakistan and India in the Southeast Asian region has led these two countries to approach different structures and to increase their cooperation with different states in the recent years. Especially Pakistan's developing economic relations with China strengthened the position of both countries against India. India's deepening of relations with the USA in certain areas created a balance against the Chinese-Pakistani bloc. In addition, India keeps its relations with Russia at a certain level in defense and energy issues. In this direction, according to Buzan and Waever, the emergence of the possibility of political separation of Pakistan indicates that Pakistan is losing its capacity to be a power pole against India and the South Asian regional security complex is therefore shifting towards unipolarity (Buzan&Waever, 2003: p.117-118).

Analysis of the Joint Pact (Tr-Aze-Pak) in Terms of Regional Security Complexes

The first step in the analysis of the regional security pact is to examine the internal structures of the region states and to determine their weaknesses. In this context, the strength or weakness of these states is determined by the stability of the internal order between the states within the regional security complexes and their nations. In other words, types of vulnerabilities of states constitute the subject of their security concerns. Secondly, the mutual relations of states within the regional security complexes are addressed, and thirdly, the region's interactions with other regions are analyzed. Finally, the role of global powers in the region is examined (Buzan&Waever, 2003: p. 51).

When the situations of the three countries are analyzed in the light of this information, it is seen that they are directly affected by the important developments related to security in their regions. The Kashmir dispute in connection with Pakistan's border problems with India for years, and the instabilities in Afghanistan, affect Pakistan in many ways. Azerbaijan has problems with its neighbor Armenia due to the Nagorno-Karabakh region that has been occupied for years. Azerbaijan liberated most of its occupied territories from Armenian occupation as a result of the 44-day war in 2020. Azerbaijan experience difficulty with Russia due to its ambivalent policies in the South Caucasus region and its support to Armenia most of the time. In addition, the presence of regions in Iran where Azerbaijani Turks live intensely affects the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran negatively. In this context, the alliance of Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan in the triple security pact will be an important development in terms of regional and global balance. The alliance becomes easier due to the fact that the infrastructure of such a union is ready. The three countries have strong common grounds in developing common security policies.

Although Pakistan doesn't have geographical borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, it will not be a disadvantage for a possible security pact. Recently, it is seen that the concept of border is not of primary importance in security-based formations. This is seen in the examples of USA and UK participation in security-based organizations such as AUKUS and QUAD established in the South Pacific. Today, there have been changes in strategic attack and defense capabilities and concepts. Now, hybrid warfare strategies have started to come to the fore. Pakistan's participation in the security pact to be established has geostrategic importance in terms of opening up a new front and dispersing the power of the threat elements in the event of a possible attack. Since Pakistan's army is 10th and Türkiye's army is the 11th in the world's strongest army ranking in terms of defense and military capacity, the influence power of the security pact increases regionally and globally. The fact that Pakistan is one of the nine countries in the world which has nuclear weapons, constitutes an important parameter in terms of deterrence. (Pakistan Ülke Analizi, 2020: p. 8).

Türkiye has made great progress and development in the field of defense industry in the recent years and making agreements with Pakistan and Azerbaijan, the common cooperation denominators of these three countries are also increasing. Within the framework of these elements, when the Türkiye-Azerbaijan and Pakistan security pact is evaluated in terms of basic military and defense elements, it is seen that the military capacities of these states have the potential to create

a disincentive and threat level reducing effect in their own regions and against global security threats. In this context, such a formation will make significant contributions to the world security architecture.

In line with this information, it is necessary to mention two functional areas in security studies. These are landsturm and deterrence. The purpose of the defense of the country is to make the opponent unable to invade the other side without military forces by threatening the possibility of invasion and attack by the neighboring and regional states. The purpose of deterrence is to eliminate the ability to act in a way that will paralyze the other side by penetrating nuclear weapons into international relations (Booth, 2012: p. 21). In the light of these views, these three countries, which are included in the security pact to be formed, are states that will complete each other in terms of country defense and deterrence. However, such a security pact to be formed may have some risks. These risks can be listed as follows:

1. There may be counter moves by global powers against the security pact to be formed by the three states. Since Türkiye is a NATO member, the establishment of such a pact will bring the two countries against each other, as it will threaten the interests of the USA in the region. Pakistan's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is another problematic. Since Pakistan has intensive commercial and military cooperation with China, such a formation will discomfort China. In addition, the fact that Pakistan and the USA are on the opposite sides in areas of regional and international politics, the problems in the relations between Pakistan and the USA will deepen. In addition to this, Russia may get a strong position against Azerbaijan, as Azerbaijan will restrict Russia's interests in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Basin with this formation.

2. The domestic policy developments of the three countries will affect this security pact. There are fragile structures in the domestic politics of these three countries. As in the example of recent domestic political developments in Pakistan, it should also be considered that the position that an externally linked political will may be opposed to the security pact.

Conclusion

Recently, in the light of regional and global developments, geopolitical developments are being experienced intensely in the geography where Türkiye is located. In line with these developments, security-oriented policies have gained intensity. In this respect, a security pact created by Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan will fill an important gap. This possible security pact also has historical and theoretical foundations. In the Sadabat Pact, which included Turkey and was established in the historical process, the main motive that brought Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq together against the expansionist policy of Soviet Russia before the Second World War was non-aggression and the preservation of friendship.

Today, while the threat elements have diversified, security flaws and challenges have increased for Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan. It was successful compared to the Sadabat Pact period and minimized security problems. In this respect, a security pact to be formed between Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan will be a deterrent element in the light of important parameters. The theoretical findings that emerged in line with the theory of regional security complexes show that these three states can come together against common security threats and that this union will enable them to establish a complex and that they can cooperate because regional security complex theory evaluates regions only on the basis of security and determines the boundaries of regional security complexes according to their security relations.

For a region to be considered as regional security complex, there must be such a degree of mutual security interdependence that a group of states differentiates them from the surrounding security zones and integrates them into an interrelated whole. In this context, the possible security pact of Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan has these elements, and also has an important potential to expand and increase its sphere of influence over time. The fact that regional and global security flaws make countries more vulnerable to threats, states' need for common safety nets increase. In this context, the strong security synergy to be created by these three countries will also reveal

reliable partners in the regional close basins. With the strong cooperation that this security pact will reveal, communication channels will be opened with the EU and the Turkish Council at certain points.

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