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### **ISLAMOPHOBIC TRENDS IN THE MODERN LIBERAL WORLD (EXAMPLE OF FRANCE)**

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As a result of the intensification of migration processes in the 20-th and 21st centuries, Islamic religion and its values, has gone far beyond its traditional area of distribution established over the centuries. Of course, at certain stages of history Islam reached the Far East and the Iberian Peninsula, where there were Muslim communities and even states, but generally dominated the Middle East.

The industrial leap of Europe in the twentieth century served as an impetus for the mass migration of cheap labor from the so-called third world countries, as a result of which diasporas began to form in developed European countries. It is these diasporas, consisting of people from the traditional Muslim area, that serve as the locomotive of the process of globalization of Islam. [ 13]

The history of each of these Muslim diasporas of Western Europe is different and has its own historical background which can be traced back to the colonial period of each region. According to some estimates, the European country with the highest percentage of the Muslim population in 2002 was France (4/5 million to 56 million, that is, 8/9%), [21] which is why political trends in France are a special subject worthy of observation and are extremely important for Muslim communities in particular and in the relationship between Western and Muslim civilizations in general.

#### **The background of muslim diaspora formation in France**

France is one of the first Western European countries to import foreign labor. Initially, the state focused on the import of migrants from

neighboring states. The reason for this was two factors: firstly, the ban on the mass migration of the so-called "colored" population from the colonies, and secondly, the need to increase the working population of the country at the expense of migrants who have similar linguistic and cultural similarities to the French. But with the beginning of the colonial war waged by France in Algeria in 1954-1962, the situation with immigration changed. After Algeria gained independence in 1962, the structure of immigration to France began to change; In this period sometimes called post-colonial immigration, in addition to able-bodied men, the families of former French soldiers of Algerian origin, the so-called "harks" have been added to the list of migrants. In addition to migrants from Algeria, people from other countries of the Maghreb, such as Morocco and Tunisia, also rushed to France. Mass flow of Maghrebians in the 1950s-1970s became the reason for the formation of the largest French diasporas. Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan. [ 23;14]

Of course, the desire to control certain processes did not begin today. In general, the course of France's policy towards the newly formed Muslim community can be divided into 2 stages. The first is an unsuccessful attempt to stop migration made back in the 70s. The second is a partially unsuccessful attempt to bring Muslim communities under the full control of the state through local Muslim organizations. This process continues to this da

*(In July 1974, the French government decided to stop immigration, and since 1978 a five-year immigrant repatriation program has*

been introduced. It was assumed that during this time about 500 thousand people would leave France. However, just like in Great Britain and Germany, these measures did not bring the desired result to the French government: their families began to come to the immigrants.) [ 19 ]

### **French political secularism and problems of adaptation of religious and ethnic minorities.**

In addition to measures to curb immigration, European countries have different approaches to the adaptation of immigrants.

The French model seems to be more complex. Here, at first glance, we also see ethnic "ghettos", but these are not Londonistans, but working-class neighborhoods and outskirts with cheap municipal housing. In France, there is no targeted policy or concept for the preservation and cultivation of national, confessional and cultural characteristics., on the contrary, there is a course towards the unification of the French nation, the propaganda of French civic identity, the basis of which is laicisms, where the state plays a more active role in excluding religious visibility from the public domain. It can be noted that this French secularism traces back to the traditions of French revolution of secular totalitarianism and preceding many today's concepts and values historically has little to do with 20th century concept of freedom of religion declared in the Human rights declaration.

The specifics of the policy of the French state for the unification of the nation can also be explained from a historical point of view. The fact is that one of the results of the French Revolution was the formation of the national idea of France around the concept of citizenship. Ethnicity and self-identification of the country's indigenous peoples (Picardians, Flemings, Burgundians, Gascons, Bretons, Provençals, etc.) were excluded from the political lexicon. Minorities themselves were not recognized as potential subjects of political law, they were citizens of the emerging French state. That is to say, French political philosophy denies to perceives a member of French society in a way other than, as an individual, and denies to recognize it as a part of any ethnic group. Belonging to French society is realized through adherence to the

universalist values of the republic, the basis of which is secularism and is defined as a civil national identity. [22;14 ]

As a result, of imposed secularism and the rejection of ethnic identity when declaring internationalism, national integration, we see the emergence of modernized ghettos, from which the traditionalist system of positive values is withdrawn, lumpenization is taking place indifferent confessional and cultural environment, which automatically turns out to be more conflictogenic.

### **Conflictogenic society**

Since the 1980s, French-born children of Maghribin immigrants began to declare themselves as Muslims more often, for many of whom the return to Islam was a compensation for their inability to integrate into French society, a reaction to manifestations of hidden or overt xenophobia. The riots that swept France in November 2005 in the suburbs inhabited by immigrants from Africa and the Middle East indicated that the French model of adaptation did not help many immigrants properly adapt to life in France and integrate harmoniously into French society. [ 11;20 ] Small excesses also become an integral part of everyday life. So as the result of failure of political course to push the secular philosophy to at least a part of society there is a situation where the part of society refuses to accept those values ,but the state finds nothing better than to continue to force it, provoking potential future conflicts

### **Muslim organizations and politization of Islam**

As already mentioned, unlike many EU countries in France, secularism is the official ideology of the state and that is why the presence of a large number of religious people and their gaining political rights runs counter to the political ideology of the state and poses a direct ideological threat to it. The pronounced secular course of the French state, continuing with some interruptions since the French Revolution, was originally aimed at combating Catholicism, the acute phase of which lasted until 1924, until the Vatican recognized the law of 1905, and the French Republic, in turn, recognized the hierarchy of the Vatican. [4;9] And only in the 80s of the twentieth century, with the advent of such

concepts as "Christian democracy" in the position of the European clergy and the French authorities, some rapprochement began to emerge. All this cannot be said about Islam, which penetrates much deeper into the everyday life of its bearers. Moreover, the French authorities are always wary of organizations, one way or another openly with foreign countries, especially Muslim ones.

After the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979-80s, the French government, in which representatives of the traditionally loyal party to migrants, the FSP (French Socialist Party), played a leading role, increasingly faced demands from Muslim migrants to recognize them the right to practice their religion. This began to worry the authorities. The first alarm bells sounded in the early 80s.

The French authorities began to seriously deal with the "Muslim issue" from March 1989, when, in response to the demands of Muslim migrants, and in order to "discuss the organization of the Muslim community of France", the Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, initiated the convening of the "Public Collegium", consisting of the most famous and respected representatives of the Muslim community from the French cities with the largest percentage of Muslims. On the basis of discussions and proposals, in March 1990, the "Council for the Discussion of the Question of Islam in France" (Conseil de réflexion sur l'islam en France - CORIF) was created.[13]

The creation of CORIF is a clear example of how the French authorities tried to limit the influence of Muslim organizations associated with abroad, in particular the Grand Mosque of Paris, which had close ties with the Algerian authorities and most of the Muslim organizations, in particular the Grand Mosque of Paris accepted the creation of CORIF as an attempt to "control the Muslim religion."

After the opposition forces led by Jacques Chirac, who were allies of the BPM, won the parliamentary elections in 1993, the new Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, being an opponent of CORIF, maintained a privileged relationship with the BPM and proposed his project for the integration of Muslim society which is known as .[ 1;7]

"Charter of the Muslim cult in France", which was developed on the initiative of Pasca.

The "Representative Council of Muslims of France" (Conseil représentatif des musulmans de France - CRMF) was also created. Pasca tried to use the historical experience of Napoleon I in relation to the French Jews, as a result of which the Jewish community was given the right to organize itself under certain state supervision. The new Minister of the Interior, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who took office in 1997, continued to deal closely with the "Muslim question" and contributed to the opening in Paris of the Institute for the Study of Islam and Societies of the Muslim World (French: L'Institut des études de l'islam et des sociétés du monde musulman - IISMM). Subsequently, IISMM became part of the Higher School for the Study of Social Sciences (French: L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales - EHESS) In October 1999, Chevènement invited the heads of the most famous Muslim organizations and imams of major mosques to consultation process.[18;22 ]. In January 2000, all participants in the consultation process signed the final document "Principles and legal bases governing relations between the administrative power and the Muslim cult in France." On March 15, 2004, France passed a law on the "secular nature of society", which prohibits the wearing of signs demonstrating religious affiliation in public institutions and schools. And although on paper this applied to all religions, in fact it was part of the deliberate policy of the French state to counteract the spread of Muslim education. The adoption of this law, which essentially restricts the rights of believers and carries elements of religious intolerance, then caused a storm of discontent in the Muslim community.

**Emmanuel Macron's l'islamophobie institutionnalisé (institutionalized islamophobia)**

The so-called "law of separatism", later renamed the "Law strengthening respect for the principles of the republic", announced by President Emmanuel Macron on October 2, 2020. From December 2020, just a week before presenting to the Council of Ministers the draft of what would later become the law "consolidat-

ing respect for the principles of the Republic", the French Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin announced in the media "to launch a massive and strong action" against 76 mosques. In parallel with this bill, Macron called on the leaders of Muslim organizations to sign the "Charter of the Principles of Islam", which, among other things, rejected the use of Islam for political purposes, as well as enforcing state interference in the practice of Muslim religion.

After the adoption of the law on July 23, 2021 by the deputies of the National Assembly by a majority of votes, it was redirected to the Constitutional Council due to criticism. Where are articles 16 (suspension of the activities of religious associations if they failed to prove their adherence to national values) and 26 (according to which any foreigner may be denied issuance or renewal of a residence permit or a residence permit may be revoked if the person "expresses opposition" to the law in question.) were found to be inconsistent with the principles of the republic

This law to which French Muslims gave the name *l'islamophobie institutionnalisé* (institutionalized islamophobia) entered into force in France on August 24, 2021. [7;14]

The law has been criticized by the international community, non-governmental and human rights organizations, mainly the UN, on the grounds that it targets Muslims and promotes discrimination.

It was planned that the law should become Emmanuel Macron's main trump card in the election race for the presidency in 2022. It is worth noting that the promulgation of the text came at a time when a dispute flared up about whether or not France should let in refugees from Afghanistan. The world community demanded that the president provide asylum to the Afghans, persecuted by representatives of the Taliban movement. The head of the Fifth Republic himself, on the contrary, called for protecting the EU "from significant irregular migration flows", emphasizing that "destabilization in Afghanistan threatens the emergence of unregulated migration flows to Europe" and the Old World must "secure itself in advance." Almost simultaneously with the promulgation of the bill, Macron's government took action.

As part of the anti-Islamic campaign launched by the French Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin, according to his own interview to the Italian publication *La Figaro* a third part of the 89 mosques in France has been closed since November 2020, when subjected to police checks during this period. In general, according to Darmanin, 650 Muslim religious worship places were closed, and 24,000 were inspected by the security forces for "extremism". In addition, bank accounts of 205 still legal Muslim organizations were seized, and two imams were deported. As part of the anti-Islamic policy, France has limited the number of visas that may be issued to citizens of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. In late 2020, the French government's decision to dissolve two of the most prominent and respected Muslim NGOs in the country, *Baraka City*, and the *CCIF* (Collective Against Islamophobia in France) by decree, shocked both French and European Muslims. While unknown at the time, this decision was to be the opening salvo for a draconian crackdown on Muslims and Muslim civil society in France. [1;5]

*CCIF*, which was declared an "enemy of the French Republic" and liquidated in 2020 by the Macron government. *CCIF* (*Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France*), established in 2003 and has become one of the most popular Muslim organizations in the country. In 2011, the UN Economic and Social Council (*ECOSOC*) gave *CCIF* the status of an official consultant. The leaders and members of the Committee like *Sami Deba* and *Marouane Muhamma* have worked closely with European democratic institutions. To promote their ideas, *CCIF* activists actively used both French-language and English-language media, from *CNN* to the *BBC*. [10;11] The Committee enjoyed a strong reputation in international organizations such as the *OSCE*, whose leaders were annually invited to human rights conferences organized by the Committee. Critics, including researcher *Jean-Christophe Moreau*, emphasized that the French Penal Code does not provide for articles for blasphemy or insulting religious feelings. On the contrary, they accused the activists of the Committee of using the term "Islamophobia" as an instrument in the fight against Islamic fun-



damentalism. Baraka City, liquidated by the Macron government was an international humanitarian organization founded in 2008 by Idris Siamedi and which was helping the poorest Muslim populations around the world.[23;3]

They are the latest examples of state sponsored crackdown on Islam and Muslims that has been accelerated under the Presidency of Macron. A total 718 Muslim organisations have been closed or dissolved by the French State (including schools, mosques and businesses). As much as €46,000,000 (\$51,089,670) millions of pounds worth of property has been seized, indicating the stringent restriction of Muslims' right to asset according to CAGE, an independent advocacy organisation that seeks to empower communities impacted by the War on Terror policies worldwide, the recent French politics against muslims fits the definition of "Persecution" under international law, as set out in Article 7 of the Rome Statute treaty, which established International Criminal Court. It is commonly mentioned by french-speaking muslim communities that the closures of associations, schools, mosques, recurrent intrusions into Muslim worship, repressive measures against imams that followed by Emmanuel Macron's, so-called "separatism" law marks a clear decline in freedom of worship, conscience and association in France. There is a big concern held by muslim societies that many shops, businesses, associations identified, targeted and harassed by French state services, not because of subversive activities or links with terrorism, but probably because run by Muslims[8;4].

Contacted by journalist Camille Polloni, the Commission for Access to Administrative Documents (CADA) considered "that the Ministry of the Interior did not have to transmit [17] the list of hundreds of places suspected of "separatism" "having been closed by the authorities". This obstruction, voluntary and assumed, suits the government, which can thus continue to unfold its communication without giving any account or allowing journalists in the first place to verify the results of this "anti-separatism" struggle. Yet so quick to criminalize and repress a whole section of society, Emmanuel Macron like his most zealous ministers, Gérald Darmanin, Jean-Michel Blanquer and Marlène Schiappa, have hardly given a voice against the

violent actions of a uninhibited extreme right or historical separatists who ostensibly claim their desire to secede from France.[ 20; 6 ]

### **Smart-colonialism and traditional values**

European civilization, now called Western, has achieved undeniable success in scientific progress. Scientific and technological progress as well as rich colonial experience helps Western civilization to maintain its first place in the world political arena. However, judging by the trends in world politics, little has changed in terms of the essence of Western politics since the colonial era. The flows of refugees from East to West as a result are caused by the expansion of the West to the East in the past, and the ongoing manipulations in the present, and not vice versa, but this fact is never taken into account by those who are dissatisfied with the influx of refugees into their countries. Today France does not play the leading political role, but historically

France left great impact on political processes which formed today's reality and the birth to many "new values" of today was given by French revolution and spread to other countries with the Napoleonic expansion. Mentioning colonialism, it should be noted that although it is officially considered that the era of colonialism has gone, the methods of modern hegemonic countries seem to be copied from the methods of the colonial era.[14; 13]. Therefore, calling modern society post-colonial is not always correct, since the main signs of colonialism in our era are not only present, but also intensified. Only the tools have changed, becoming more sophisticated, the essence has remained unchanged.

The merger of trading companies (regulated and joint-stock partnerships) with the ruling elites was a characteristic feature of the politics of the colonial era. Today, the era of transnational companies can be called smart colonialism, which captures not only commercial and industrial but also educational, medical, research and other areas with financial embraces. Traditional cultural and religious values stand in the way of new forcibly introduced values, against which an undeclared war is being waged. And one of the clearest examples of this undeclared hybrid war is the anti-Islamic campaign in France.

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## Xülasə

**Rauf Məmmədov**

### **Müasir Liberal Dünyada İslamofobiya cərəyanları (Fransa nümunəsi)**

Məqalədə Fransa dövləti ilə 20-ci əsrin ortalarında Fransada formalaşmış müsəlman diasporları arasında münasibətlərin tarixinə qısa baxış verilmişdir. Məqalədə bu münasibətlərdəki problemlər həm islamofobiya nöqtəyi-nəzərindən, həm də bu cür siyasətin səbəblərini laisizm nöqtəyi-nəzərindən araşdırılıb, eləcə də ənənəviləyin və sekularizmin arasında qarşıdurma nöqtəyi-nəzərindən ax-tarmağa cəhd edilir.

*Açar sözlər:* Smart müstəmləkəçilik, islamofobiya, İslam, Fransa, Makron, müsəlman, diaspora, Avroislam, Fransız inqilabı

## Резюме

**Рауф Мамедов**

### **Исламофобские течения в современном либеральном мире (на примере Франции)**

Статья включает в себя краткий обзор истории взаимоотношений Французского государства с мусульманскими диаспорами, сформированными во Франции в середине 20-го века. В статье не только рассмотрены проблемы в этих отношениях с точки зрения исламофобии, но и проведена попытка найти причины подобной политике с точки зрения лаицизма, а также с точки зрения противостояния традиционализма и секуляризма.

*Ключевые слова:* Smart колониализм, исламофобия, Ислам, Франция, Макрон, мусульмане, diaspora, евроислам, французская революция