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THE SITUATION IN THE MILITARY SPHERE IN ARMENIA AND THE CONDITIONS THAT EMERGED AFTER THE 44-DAY WAR

Keywords: *Armenia, army, weapon, military spending, psychological state*

Introduction

At the end of the 20th century - the beginning of the 21st century, the Caucasus region became the center of attention due to its geopolitical and geostrategic position, and occupied an important place in the foreign policy of the world's leading states. Ensuring national security was one of the most important issues for the South Caucasus states that regained their independence. The most important factor for national security is the strengthening of defense capabilities. It was not an easy process. After 1991, Armenia faced many problems related to building an army, ensuring the stable development of the military field and renewing the military infrastructure due to the limited economic resources and lack of budget. One of the main reasons that had a negative impact on the development of the army and the military sector in Armenia, like other fields, was the occupation policy against Republic of Azerbaijan.

The main purpose of the research is the study of the current situation in the Armenian army at the current stage, the analysis of the work done in the military field in this country after the liberation of the Azerbaijani territories from occupation and the heavy blow to the Armenian army in 2020. During the research, statistical and comparative analysis methods were used. For the first time, an attempt was made to diversify Armenia's arms supply and to study the tactical and technical characteristics of weapons purchased from supplier countries.

First years of Army-building process

One of the first tasks facing the independent states that emerged in the Caucasus region

was to create an army after the collapse of the USSR. Armenia was the first among the republics of the South Caucasus to organise armed groups and create an army on their basis. Part of the sovereign territories of Azerbaijan was occupied with the participation of these armed groups. Some Armenian researchers consider the organization of these armed groups and their activities to be the root and foundation of the history of the creation of the army.

Already in 1990, several volunteer units were established in different parts of Armenia, combat duty was organized in border villages. However, the mere formation of volunteer units and the population's access to large quantities of weapons and ammunition led to instability in Armenia by uncontrolled armed groups. The "independent army" in Armenia began to be formed at the beginning of 1991 at the base of the Russian army. The Government of Armenia, whose main goal was aggression, adopted on 28 January 1992 a decision "On the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Armenia", on the basis of which the Armenian National Army was established. The country's first Defence Minister was Vazgen Sarkisyan. Under the terms of the "Dashkand Agreement" on the division of military bases located on the territory of the former Soviet republics, signed on 15 May 1992, Armenia was given the 16th and 17th brigades of the 7th Guards Army of the Russian Federation, 250 tanks, 220 armoured vehicles, 285 artillery pieces, 100 combat aircraft and 50 combat helicopters [2, p.131]. Russia's pro-Armenian position played an important role in this matter. New and better military equipment was given to Armenia. Vazgen

Sargsyan was again appointed as the Minister of Defence in 1995 and he remained in this position until 1999. According to the distribution of Armenian authors, it was the period of army formation and is characterised by the establishment of new military units, training units and centres, training grounds and barracks in the territory of the Republic of Armenia and the occupied Karabakh region and surrounded territories of Azerbaijan [18]. Armenians who dreams "Great Armenia" consider that they will realize this during the establishment of the army and after that, they have carried out a policy of occupation at the expense of foreign aid. This so called dreams and aggressive goals predetermined the crisis that would arise in the army and military sphere after some time.

The Republic of Armenia paid special attention to strengthening the army. Although the first reason for this was to protect the country's borders and ensure its security, in fact the main purpose was to strengthen in the occupied lands of Azerbaijan and prolong the period of occupation. In such a case, the Armenian authorities could plunder Azerbaijani lands and illegally use natural resources. Maintaining an illegal army and strengthening positions in the economic regions of Eastern Zangazur and Karabakh of Azerbaijan served this purpose. Destruction of historical monuments, turning mosques into ruins, refusal of Armenian authorities and army to carry out construction and improvement works during the occupation proves that although they tried to deny that these territories were the ancestral lands of Azerbaijanis, they subconsciously accepted it. Some foreign forces also provided all kinds of material and moral support to Armenia in looting the surface and underground resources of Azerbaijan and keeping its territories under occupation. Countries that sold weapons to the occupying state and provide it with military ammunition have demonstrated their support for the terrorist state and its policies.

Weapons Supply of the Army and Supplier Countries

Russia has the largest share in paying for military ammunition for the Armenian army. Military relations between Russia and Armenia have been established since 1992, immediately

after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Republic of Armenia signed the Collective Security Treaty on 15 May 1992 and became a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Membership in this organization has created opportunities for Armenia in the field of the army as well as in other fields. Also, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia undertook to help each other in dangerous situations according to the interstate agreement signed in 1997. Russia has prioritized the use of Armenia in its policy and has been its main supplier of weapons and weapon systems. During 1995-1996, Russia transferred weapons and equipment worth 1 billion US dollars to Armenia. "Scud" operational-tactical missiles were also included in this provision [10, p.49]. Also, Armenia acquired 9K72 "Elbrus" OTRKs and 32 liquid-fuel R-17 warhead missiles for them from Russia in 1993-1996 [3]. On 14 February 1997, Aman Tuleyev, the Minister of Cooperation of the Russian Federation with CIS countries made a statement and announced the fact that Russian weapons were illegally sent to the Republic of Armenia. It was clear from his statement that in 1994-1996, 84 T-72 tanks, 50 armored vehicles, as well as spare parts for them were sent to Armenia with a total amount of 270 billion Rubles [5, p.266].

A large part of the property was transported by Russia from the Akhalkalak and Batumi military bases in Georgia was not given to the 102nd base located in Armenia, but to the Armenian army in 2006-2007 [10, p.49]. In addition, 16 2S3 "Akatsiya" self-propelled artillery systems were donated to Armenia. Armenia acquired from Russia 1 Mi-24P helicopter in 2001, 2 Mi-8IVs, 5 Mi-8MTs in 2003, 2 Il-76M military aircraft in 2004, 2 Mi-24 attack helicopters in 2011, 4 S-300PS complexes in 2009, GAZ-2975 Tigr armored vehicles in a number which is not disclosed [10, p.49]. The Russian-Armenian military cooperation agreement signed in 2013 provided for Armenia to purchase Russian military equipment at Russian domestic prices. The tradition of transferring arms to Armenia at reasonable prices has continued to this day without interruption.

Russia sent armored personnel carriers, air defence systems and multiple rocket launchers, as well as tanks to Armenia during 2011-2020.

Armenia used these weapons in the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The 300-kilometer-range "Iskandar" missiles supplied by Russia in 2016 are also included in this list. Armenia used the "Smerch" missile complex it bought from Russia in 2016-2017 to bombing Azerbaijani cities. Another missile used in this process, the Elbrus missile, is also manufactured in Russia, and member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization can buy it, like other weapons, on preferential terms. A multi-apartment building was razed to the ground, 10 people were killed and 35 were injured as a result of a devastating rocket attack by the Armenian armed forces in Ganja on 11 October, 2020. As a result of the attack on 17 October, 13 people were killed and more than 50 civilians were injured. Azerbaijani officials said both strikes were carried out by Elbrus-type missiles.

India is one of the countries that contributed to the continuation of Armenia's policy of aggression. The roots of the Armenian-Indian partnership in the military field are not so ancient. India is clearly concerned about the rapid development of relations between Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Turkey in recent times, and has strengthened its military ties with Armenia against the backdrop of this concern. Also, Pakistan's support of Azerbaijan in its just struggle with Armenia, and the support of Azerbaijan to Pakistan in the Kashmir issue are among the main factors affecting India's relations with Armenia. According to the information published on the "Armenianweekly" website, a number of military agreements have been signed between the Republics of Armenia and India in order to prevent the steps taken by Azerbaijan in the direction of restoring its territorial integrity. During the Second Karabakh War, India supplied Armenia with "Swati" anti-artillery radars [7, p. 4]. Some Indian websites also publish information about Armenia's new arms supply. Thus, in the Indian newspaper "The Economic Times" "Armenia is arming itself. The article "India will export rockets and weapons" states that Yerevan has spent 20 billion rupees (244.7 million US dollars) to buy weapons. According to this publication, the arms supply contracts were signed in September 2022. The arms deal includes the export of

Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRL), anti-tank missiles, ammunition worth 250 million US dollars. It should be noted that the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system is a domestic technique of India, and India sells Pinaka missiles to a foreign country for the first time in the example of Armenia. In the article, it was mentioned that the price of rocket volley systems is reasonable and easy to use, and it was emphasized that it is an ideal weapon system for Armenia. India's 214 mm all-weather Pinaka missiles are designed to destroy manpower, light armored vehicles and fortifications, as well as to remotely emplace anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields. The information published on the Indian "Firstpost" website also stated that Armenia is interested in buying Indian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and anti-UAV defense systems, and that more deals will be signed in the near future [12].

In November 2023, the Indian news site "EurAsian Times" published information that Armenia signed a contract with the company "Zen Technologies" operating in Hyderabad for the purchase of anti-drone systems with a total value of 41.5 million US dollars [31]. This system has the ability to detect, identify and neutralize UAVs by disrupting their communications system. This signed contract includes training for military personnel to work with the systems.

There are also reports of certain military cooperation between Iran and Armenia. The document that stands for the establishment of relations between the two countries is the declaration "On the principles and goals of the relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran" was signed in February 1992. Systematic relations in the field of military co-operation between the Islamic Republic of Armenia and Iran have been strengthened after 2000. Security was high on the list of areas discussed in meetings at the level of government officials between 2009 and 2011 [3, p.33]. The issue of strengthening military and security cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran was included in most of the government programs adopted in Armenia during 2015-2018 [3, p.35].

Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, the former commander of the Islamic Revolution-

ary Guard Corps and senior military aide to Iran's Supreme Leader, confirmed that Armenia is among the countries that officially applied for the purchase of Iranian-made drones in October 2022 [17].

Serbia is also on the list of countries to which the Armenian army supplies weapons. According to the information submitted by Armenia to the UN Conventional Weapons Registry system, Yerevan bought 250 M93 "Black Arrow" sniper rifles and 100 30 mm AGM-17 grenade launchers from Serbia in 2007. It exported to Armenia 200 M-57 and M70 "Commando" mortars, and an undisclosed number of 82 mm M79 howitzers (as well as ammunition for this weapon) and M-80 single-shot grenades in 2016, through Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, Serbia's DG Arms Corporation has played a key role in arms procurement for Armenia until 2018. The name of this company has repeatedly been mentioned in illegal arms sales to Libya and Syria. A 20 mm caliber M55A4B1 anti-aircraft gun made in Serbia was acquired for the use of the Armenian separatist military units in Karabakh in August 2019 [9].

The Kingdom of Jordan is also on the list of countries selling arms to Armenia with a small percentage. In 2019, Armenia received used Osa-AKM air defence systems from Jordan. In the same year, Bulgaria also sold 500 grenades and 1094 machine guns to Armenia [30].

Armen Grigoryan, the head of the Security Council, in an interview with Public Television on 5 June 2023, emphasized that Armenia is conducting intensive discussions with many countries regarding the acquisition of new weapons. He said that *"Armenia cannot import weapons considering the Russia-Ukraine war and is looking for other resources. We are also working intensively with our Western partners to strengthen our cooperation in the security sector, and we will continue this work."* Afterwards, Armenian political analyst Andrias Ghukasyan said in an interview with Jam news that Armenia should replace military cooperation with Russia with co-operation with Western countries. All this suggests that Armenia is already interested in pro-Western policy and plans to devote more space to it in the military sphere. According to Intelligence Online, the "Araratnews" website reported in an article

published on 28 April 2023 that French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna said that during a briefing she had with Ararat Mirzoyan in Yerevan, there were discussions about the appointment of a military attaché at the French Embassy in Yerevan. The article also emphasizes that this decision may be an expression of France's desire to create its own military relationship with Armenia, thereby ending Armenia's exclusive military relationship with Moscow, both in terms of trust and ammunition [23]. Discussions on the establishment of military cooperation between France and Armenia began to become more active in 2020 after the military operations carried out by the Azerbaijani army to liberate its territories from occupation.

Suren Papikyan, the Defence Minister of the Republic of Armenia and his French counterpart Sebastien Lecor signed an agreement on military cooperation. According to this agreement, Armenia will acquire three "Ground Master 200 (GM220)" radar systems from the French "Thales" defence group. This radar is capable of detecting and tracking UAVs, helicopters, and cruise missiles. France sold two of these systems to Ukraine. Moldova, the Netherlands and Norway also have GM 200 French radars. According to certain sources, the estimated cost of one system is 14 million euros [16].

The agreement, signed in October, also includes Mistral air defence missiles. The missiles are capable of hitting targets up to 8 kilometres away. The French Defence Minister announced that their development would cost about 500,000 euros [16].

Provision of Army Personnel

One of the most important factors in the army is manpower. Since 1994, the Armenian army has been working towards building the army, increasing the combat effectiveness of the troops, strengthening discipline, training and education of officers and warrant officers, including contractors, and ensuring the link between the army and society. Several programs were organized and draft laws were adopted in order to increase the interest of young people in the military field. However, the policy of aggression carried out by various authorities had negative effects on the development of the ar-

my. Along with the declining interest in military service among young people, there has been an increase in cases of evasion from actual service in the army.

In order to strengthen the army-society relations, the "Military Servicemen's Insurance Fund" was established, and the laws "On Defence" and "On Military Service and the Status of Military Servicemen" were adopted in 2016. Based on these laws, the "I Am" (Ես եմ) and "I Have Honour" (Պատիվ ունեմ) programmes were organised, which served to raise public readiness to a high level and to strengthen the Army's home front and reserve forces. The "I Am" program was aimed at providing preferential terms to conscripts, and the "I Have Honour" program was aimed at training highly educated military personnel [18]. The number of military personnel in Armenia was 44.8 thousand, and 66.95 thousand in Azerbaijan in the same year according to the information of the "2020 Military Balance" report prepared by the International Strategic Research Institute [25]. A ten-year comparison shows that the measures taken during this period have had a negative result, and the Armenian army has also declined in manpower supply.

After the Second Karabakh War, the Armenian army faced an even greater crisis in personnel supply. One of the biggest crimes of the Armenian government after the war was the distortion and concealment from the people of the information about the Armenian military personnel who were destroyed during the war. Although various information was released during the two years after the war, the latest figures about the losses were announced by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on 10 February 2022, during a question-and-answer session with government representatives in the parliament. It was reported that the number of losses of the Armenian side during the 44-day war was 3812 people, and the fate of 217 people remained unknown [1]. According to the information published by "The Economist" of Great Britain based on the world databases of "Human Mortality Database" and "World Mortality Dataset" sites, the losses of Armenia are about 6300 people [8]. The defeat of Armenia and the loss of many lives caused discontent among the people. Due to the large number of casualties,

the delay in the examination processes, the fact that the dead remained in the morgues and war zones for days increased the dissatisfaction causing actions and speeches against the government. Dissatisfied parents tried to dissuade their children from serving in the army, desertion and disobedience increased. Even during the war, Armenian soldiers left their posts and positions, put down their weapons and tried to run back. Images have emerged of soldiers being tied to trenches by commanders to prevent them from leaving their positions. Facing with problems related to the provision of manpower, the Armenian authorities used mercenary help in the army during the Second Karabakh War. Russian journalist Ilya Azar first reported on Armenians using mercenaries in Karabakh in "Novaya gazeta" newspaper. In his article, he interviewed French citizen Artur Oganisyan, who came to Karabakh to fight on the side of Armenia [13]. Combat instructor Karapet Aghajanyan, who trains local and foreign volunteers in Yerevan, told Reuters that about 10 Lebanese Armenians were trained in his camp [11]. Although the spread facts were denied by the Armenian officials, the reality remained unchanged.

The impact of the war on negative public attitudes towards the army in Armenia is undeniable. However, distrust, lack of trust, incompetent policy of the state in military and army matters prevailed even before the war. In January 2019, former Armenian Defence Minister David Tonoyan confirmed in an interview with Talin Papazian, a researcher at the University of Southern California's Institute for Armenian Studies, that trust in the army has declined in Armenian society and that reforms are needed in the army [19].

Military Expenses and Economic Situation

Budgeting and cost allocation was a very complex and time-consuming process for the South Caucasus states that regained their independence. Prioritizing military expenses was a more important nuance for Armenia and Azerbaijan in this process. Azerbaijan's military expenses were 5 times higher than Armenia's during 1995-2020. Armenia allocated nearly 7.4 billion US dollars to the Ministry of Defence over 25 years. Azerbaijan spent about 32.5 bil-

lion US dollars on military expenses, defence and security sectors according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Only in 2020, the military expenses of Armenia amounted to 634 million US dollars, and the military expenses of Azerbaijan amounted to 2.2 billion US dollars. Armenia's defence ministry has been allocated about 600 million US dollars and Azerbaijan's defence and national security sectors about 2.6 billion US dollars in 2021 [25]. Increasing military expenses is related to the country's economic situation. A country with strong, stable economic growth has the power to increase its military expenses. Azerbaijan is also on the list of such countries in the region. Thus, in 2020, the fact that Azerbaijan's oil pipeline networks have already reached the borders of the European Union, the positive development of the economic sphere, non-oil sectors led to an increase in the state budget of Azerbaijan and an increase in the ratio of military expenditures to GDP from 3,9% to 5,4% [25]. In Armenia, from the end of the twentieth century to the second decade of the twenty-first century, the economic situation became tense and a significant reduction in military expenditures was recorded. The financial crisis that occurred in 2008 had a serious impact on the economy of Armenia, the GDP of Armenia in 2008-2009 fell from 11,7 billion US dollars to 8,6 billion US dollars [25]. This meant a decrease of 26%. The defeat of Armenia in the war in 2020 revealed another point. It has become clear that the country's revenues and military expenses must be proportional, and the increase in military expenses must be carried out taking into account the budget revenues. For many years, Armenia has only increased mili-

tary expenditures in accordance with the goals of the occupation. This has led to its weakening from an economic point of view.

***Disobedience, Bribery,
Criminal Cases in the Army***

After the Second Karabakh War, the government stepped up efforts to overcome distrust of the army among young people. Starting from 2020, the provision of apartments or residential houses on preferential terms to military personnel and officers serving on the basis of the contract has been started according to the decision of the government No.1091 [15]. However, this decision could not increase the interest in the army and did not give the expected results. Mistrust is also rooted in corruption and crime. Thus, the website "Azadutyun" published information about the suicide of three servicemen in non-combat conditions in one week in August 2022. Armine Sadikyan, a human rights activist of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly office - Vanadzor also said that after the change of government in 2018 and the war in the army, no reforms have been made to prevent such incidents and the promises made by the authorities have not been fulfilled. He also emphasized that if systemic reforms are not carried out by the state, similar situations will continue. According to the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly - Great Church (Vanadzor) office, 6 criminal cases involving suicide were initiated in 2022, the number of criminal cases initiated involving Suicide Clauses was 18 in 2020 - the year of war, it was 11 in 2018, it was 10 in 2017, and 15 suicides in non-combat conditions in 2016 [14]. (table 1)




Table 1.

The human rights defender of Artur Ajamyan, one of the two soldiers who committed suicide in the army in December 2019, disclosed to the press what he told his family about the situation in the army before his death: *"If they want to kill someone, they take them, kill them in positions, there are problems in the military unit, the situation is like hell"* [22].

The number of deaths in the Armenian army due to non-combat killings, health-related issues and suicide cases is several times higher than the number of deaths due to ceasefire violations in 2022 [14]. Military expert David Jamalyan also stated in his interview to "Sputnik Armenia" channel that there are serious system problems in the army, and that many officers, platoon and division commanders are vacant. He emphasized that there is a shortage of officers, control and discipline problems in the army due to the current situation. He also stated that under the name of "military reforms", the current administration focuses on the police and patrol service, not the army, and is more interested in the expansion and strengthening of the police as a pressure apparatus that can be used against its citizens [26].

15 Armenian servicemen died as a result of a fire in the shelter of the military unit located in Azad village of Bashkand (Gegharkunik) province on 19 January 2023. In April, the parents of the soldiers who died in the fire held a protest in front of the government building, demanding a meeting with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Minister of Defence [21]. At one of the government meetings, the prime minister made a statement that the incident occurred as a result of the carelessness of the soldiers. However, the parents stated that the army was not fully provided with the necessary means, claimed that the incident was committed intentionally, and blamed the authorities [27], [29]. Compared to other years in the Armenian army, including this event the number of non-combat deaths increased by 31 percent in 2023 [6].

The number of servicemen serving under contract in the Armenian army is decreasing year by year. There was a 44 per cent decrease in the number of contracted military personnel between 2010 and 2019 according to the indica-

tor. Thus, the number of servicemen serving under the contract was 44 thousand in 2010, and this number was 24 thousand in 2019 [24]. During the last 15 years, every year in the country there are fewer military servicemen who want to serve under a contract than in the previous year [24].

Cases of bribery have been increasing in Armenia over the past ten years. In the magazine "Study of Public Opinion on Corruption in Armenia" published in 2019, corruption was included among the most common problems in society [20]. This "growth" also manifests itself in the field of the army. High-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defence have been detained by the National Security Service in connection with a number of acts of corruption. There were more cases of bribery in the army during the Second Karabakh War. So, in Armenia and in the former so-called "republic", the facts of receiving bribes to evade service have been recorded in the military units located in the places where military operations were conducted. Human rights activists have repeatedly recognised in interviews that both the past and present authorities have failed to cleanse the army of corruption, that the promises made have not been fulfilled and that the meagre measures taken are ineffective. In addition to unlawful behaviour in the Armenian army, constant abuse of young conscripts, and cases of evasion of military service through bribes, corruption in the army food supply has also increased significantly. It is no coincidence that the number of gastrointestinal, skin and dysentery diseases among military personnel doubled between 2007 and 2008, and this figure has continued to progress over the years. During on-site inspections, it was found that expired and low-quality foodstuffs were used in the daily rations of servicemen. Answering journalists' questions in 2019, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that there are problems in this sphere as well. He inspected the nutrition of soldiers on the front line and stated that there were serious shortcomings and emphasised that there were cases of corruption in the supply of food to the army [32].

News about the sale of food intended for the army in 2021 was also published in the

press. Artak Karapetyan, former Minister of Defence of the Republic of Armenia, in one of his interviews admitted violations of the law in the food supply of the army.

After the Second Karabakh War, Armenian media published images of the soldiers' conditions of service. These images show that the soldiers spent the night on cold stones and were not provided with means for heating.

The press reported that the servicemen were psychologically unwell. Human rights defenders have noted that work on psychological and social adaptation in the army is not carried out, there are not enough specialists and personnel for this purpose, and the situation in this direction is deplorable.

Conclusion

The policy of aggression carried out by Armenia affected its general economic development and did not allow ensuring the real security of the country. The army has become a tool of occupation, not a guarantee of protection and security. The Armenian army is currently experiencing a difficult period. The reputation of the army in front of the people and society has weakened. The provision of weapons under the guise of humanitarian support by foreign forces has not been able to get the Armenian army out of the situation, which serves the occupation policy.

Currently, the Armenian army is experiencing a serious shortage of equipment and military ammunition as a result of the lack of manpower and the desertion of soldiers during the war. This created chaos has also led to an increase in crimes in the army and arbitrariness by high-ranking military officials. Soldiers and officers serve in conditions without special care and provision. Due to these reasons, the number of desertions, deaths, beatings, bribery, suicide and other military crimes in the Armenian army is constantly increasing.

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Xülasə

Hüseynova Xuraman

Ermənistanda hərbi sahənin vəziyyəti və 44 günlük müharibədən sonra yaranmış şərait

Məqalədə SSRİ-nin dağılmasından sonra Ermənistanda ordunun və digər silahlı qüvvələrin formalaşması, işğalçılıq siyasətinin ordu quruculuğu prosesinə təsiri, silah və canlı qüvvə ilə təminatı, hərbi xərclər araşdırılır. Məqsəd İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsindən əvvəl və sonra orduda vəziyyətin müqayisəli təhlilini aparmaq, həmçinin bu sahədə aparılan işlərin səmərəsini və nəticələrini araşdırmaqdır. Dövlətin qəbul etdiyi qərarlar və həyata keçirilən tədbirlər, iqtisadi amillərin, sosial böhranın orduya təsiri təhlil edilib. Orduda hərbi qulluqçuların psixoloji durumu, gənclərin hərbi sahəyə marağı öyrənilib. Məqalədə ilk dəfə olaraq Ermənistanın silah təchizatının şaxələndirilməsindən bəhs edilir, təchizatçı ölkələrdən alınan silahların taktiki və texniki xüsusiyyətləri araşdırılır. Məqalənin yazılması zamanı erməni dilli mətbuatdan toplanmış materiallar sistəmləşdirilib, müqayisəli təhlil aparılıb.

Açar sözlər: Ermənistan, ordu, silah, hərbi xərclər, psixoloji vəziyyət

Резюме

Гусейнова Хураман

Ситуация в военной сфере в Армении и условия, сложившиеся после 44-дневной войны

В статье рассматривается формирование армии и других вооруженных сил Армении после распада СССР, влияние оккупационной политики на процесс строительства армии, обеспечение вооружением и живой силой, военные расходы. Целью является проведение сравнительного анализа ситуации в армии до и после Второй Карабахской войны, а также изучение эффективности и результатов работы, проводимой в этом направлении. Анализируется влияние на армию решений и мер, принимаемых государством, экономических факторов, социального кризиса. Изучено психологическое состояние военнослужащих в армии и интерес молодежи к военной сфере. В статье впервые рассматривается диверсификация поставок вооружения Армении, рассматриваются тактико-технические характеристики вооружения, закупаемого у стран-поставщиков. При написании статьи были систематизированы материалы, собранные в армяноязычной прессе, и проведен сравнительный анализ.

Ключевые слова: Армения, армия, оружие, военные расходы, психологическое состояние